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I. Introduction
Inflation has been stronger in the United States since World War II
than in any other three consecutive decades of the nation's history.
Prices have declined less than they used to in periods of business
recession, and the declines have offset less of the increases dur-
ing business expansions even though the latter have also diminished.
This change in cyclical behavior lies at the heart of the 'inflation
problem" as it has been discussed in recent years. The present
studyexaminesthe recession behavior of wholesale prices since World
War II and compares it with the 1920s as the most recent period of
earlier recessions withcomparableseverity. The focus is on changes
inrecession behavior, possible bias in the data, and differences
in behavior between various groups of wholesale prices. (Differences
between wholesale and consumer prices, though of importance, are
not examined here.) The purpose is to extend the evidence on the
degree and uniformity of the chang in price behavior and to test
various interpretations of those changes.
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Theeductionof Cyclical Arnplitude in Agratc Frice Indexes
Table1 reports the cyclical behavior of the ureau of Labor
Statistics index of all wholesale prices and all items excluding
farm products and processed foods. In the four business recessions
following1949 the aggregate index did not decline and inthelast
three iteven rose. In previous recessions this index had failed
to decline only twice (in 1900 and the short after-war recession in
1
1945).In 1951 and 1970 itevenrose faster in the recessions
than in the preceding expansions, a perverse cyclical behavior which
it never exhibited before. Resultsforall items excluding foods
The BIindexbegins in 1890. The Warren-Pearson index of
wholesaleprices covering 185/t to 1890 (not shown) rose in the
final two (1887 and 1890) of the seven recessions in that period.
For an analysis of specific cycles in the rates of change
of wholesale prices, see Geoffrey H. Moore, 'The Cyclical Be-
havior of Prices,' Bureau of Labor Statisticsport 384,1971.
show an even sharner break in the1950s from thepast.While this
index declinedin all recessions since1891except 1945 and 1970,
the declines were much less in the four following 1949. The decline
relative to the exransion rate has diminished steadily since l9'),
culminating in 1970 with the perverse cyclical behavior of the re-
cession rate exceeding the expansion rate. Such perversity occurred
only once before in 1894 for this index. The rate of change of the ag-
gregate index is graphed inChart 1.
AppendixTable A shows the cyclical behavior of three major
subgroups of wholesale prices available since 19l, basic materials,
intermediategoods, and finished goods. A sharp decline in cyclical
amplitude occurs for all three subgroups in the recessions following
1919,demonstratingthat it cannot be attributed to a reduced impor-
tance in the aggregate indexofthe more volatile prices ofbasic ma-By Period
6 cycles 1921-49
4cyclesl99-7O
By Period and Similar severityb
2 cycles 1921-27 3.2
2 cycles 1954-61 1.2
-4,0-7.22,6 -6.8-9.4
1.0-0.2 7•2 -0.2_24
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
a
Rates of change are computed between average levels of three
months surrounding peaks and troughs. Series are seasonally adjusted.
bseverity of business recessions is based on Geoffrey H. Moore,
(ed.), Business Cycle Indicators, vol. I, 1961, NI3ER, P. 104, and
updated in Annual Report,1973, NBER, p. 18.
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The exransion rates have also declined, thouqh not uniformly.
some C)aflS.iOflS in the 1920s and earlier had rates of price change
as low or below those of some postwar cycles. Although it was not
unusual in the 192-Os and earlier for the expansion rates to be low,
it was rare for the recession rate not to drop appreciably below
zero.Itis true that the cycles in business activity have been
milderontheaverage since World War II than formerly, but a
change in behavior of rices is strikingly apparent even after al-
lowing for differeres in the cyclical amplitude of business activ-
ity. A pairing of twomildrecessions in the 1950s with twoin the
192-Os at the bottomof Table 1 still shows that the ].ater price
swingswereconsiderably smaller, thoughless so for expansion rates
alone. Although expansion rates have moved down atthe same time
thatrecession rates have moved up toward and past zero,recession
rates have moved farther.
The present study is generally concerned with the response of
pricesto recessions, but the main emphasis is on recession rates
relative to the preceding expansion rates, which is equivalent to
an analysis of the overall cyclical amplitudeof rates of price
change.
Pc s s ib le Bias thAgeat e Indexes
Althoughthe implications of the decline in measured prcc
changeshave been widely discussed, its statistical basis deserves
re-examination. Because we want to distinguish broad changes in
market behavior from changes in statistical composition of thedata,
thereare several difficulties in relying exclusively on the aggre-
gate indexes. They are disproportionatel' influenced by certa in_/t_
productgroups, and the composition and weighting have
shifted over time toward the less volatile prices of manufacturedgoods.
Althoughthe index for finished goods in Table .Ashowsthe same change
in cyclical behavior as that for basic materials andintermediategoods,
the composition of each of these subindexes hasalsoshifted over time;
the substitution of newseriesfor old andincreases in the total
numberhave given more weight to the highly fabricated products which
characteristically exhibit less price fluctuation. A 1952 revisionof
theindex reduced the recession rate of decline for intermediate and
finished goods, though not for basic materials, as is shown by the over-
lap in Table A
A study by McAllister2 found that an increase in the index
2
HarryB.McAllister, "Statistical Factors Affecting the Sta-
bilityof the Wholesale and Consumers' PriceIndexes," The Price
Statisticsof the Federal Government, NBER, 1961, pp. 373-418.
from 550 to 784 items in 1931 produced anaverage reduction in amplitude
of 15 per cent for cyclical movements in the period ofoverlap, 1926-31.
For an increase from about 900 to 1900 items in 1952, theaverage reduc-
tion in amplitude was 21per cent for the period of overlap, 1947—51.
These amplitudes are based on cyclical highs and lows in the index rather
the (as in Table 1).
than the change from thepeaktcf troughdatesof business cycles/ The
1931 and 1952 revisions encompass most of the enlargement from about 530
items in the early 1920s to about 2100 by l960. Their combined effect
3
AllanD. Searle, "Weight Revisions in the Wholesale Price Index,
1890-1960," Monthly Labor Reviews February 1962, pp. 175-182.
on cyclical amplitude wastoreduce it by one third (.85 x .79 =.67).-
McAllister'stables indicate that nearly all the reduction after
the first revision was due to the reduced amplitude of the finished goods
index. For the later revision, the 1945-49 overlap in Table A shows that
all the reduction occurred in the components for intermediate and finished
goods; the amplitude of the materials component actually rose. These re-
ductions likely reflect the addition of less volatile prices. Simply
adding more items, once the number already exceeds a few hundred, would
4
not reduce the amplitude much further.
4
This can be shown as follows. Suppose an index Z is composed
of n prices (xi), all with the same weight and variance2 and a correlation
coefficientR with each other. (This example abstracts from changes in
the weighting andvarianceof new items andconcentrateson changes
in number of items only.)
n
z= Ex./n11'
ando=øandR =Rforallij. x. x.,x. 1 1)
2 —2 —
2
Then 0 = + n(n-1)a ,
2
az— —=R+---—n
For large n, this approaches ifromabove. Hence the variance of the
index will not under these assumptions decline much for increases in
n beyond a moderate size.
McAllisteralso examined the number of reporters per individual
price series, which hasgenerallyincreased. The useofmore reports
for each series increases the probability of catching andrecordingsmall
changes in market prices, but averaging tends to smooth the movements
in individual price quotations. The effect on cyclical amplitude,
however,is probably. minor.To avoid the problem of changingcoverageandweighting,the present
study analyzes frequency distributions of price changes for the same
products. Section II presents distributions of subindexes of wholesale
prices for which the converage of products has continued from the 1920s
to 1970 without major change. They make up most of the aggregate index
in the 1920s but only half by weight in the 1960s. These subindexes
allow us to compare the behavior of the same prices in the two mild re-
cessions of the 1920s with the five after World War II. (The dates are
thoseshown in Table 1.,) The 1930s and World War II are omitted as
not being comparable with the mild postwar cycles. Section III
analyzes frequency distributions of the prices of 1100 individual
products which have no gaps or major changes in specification from
1947 to 1970. Section IV utilizes the Stigler-Kindahl data on pri-
ces collected from buyers in order to determine whether and to what
extent BLS reports fTom sellers are biased. These sections are de-
signed to identify and circumvent possible bias in the cyclical be-
havior of the aggregate indexes.
Possible Explanations of the Reduction in Cyclical Amrlitude
As a first step toward explanation of the changes in price be-
havior, Section V analyzes prices according to three characteris-
tics of products and markets: the degree of processing and durabil-
ity of products, the fraction of value added in production, and the
market concentration of firms. These three were chosen because they
are relevant to various theories of price behavior and also because
the necessary data are available. Durable products are held in
inventory, high value added reflects a preponderance of wage costs,
and high market concentration can lead to tacit collusion on pricing.
All of these are thought to make prices less subject to shifts in-7-
demand and less volatile. It is conceivable that the effects on
prices of high wage costs and concentration have intensified over
the postwar period to produce the observed attenuation in price
responses. A grouping of prices by the degree to which they are
subject to each of these characteristics helps to determine the
importance of these influences.
Section VI summarizes and interprets the findings.
II
Comparison of Post-World War II with the 1920s
Does the long-run decline in cyclical amplitude from the l920s to
post-World War II pertain to xmst of the individual price series
or is it largely a reflection of changes in the composition of the
aggregate indexes? It is desirable to examine indexes which have
had little change in coverage. Price series from the l920s to 1970
are available without breaks for only a small number of individual
products, but many continuous series exist for groups of essentially
the same closely related products. There are 48 major component
series of the wholesale price index which are available from 1926
to1970, and 44ofthese can be extended back to 1923.The48
series makeup 93per cent by weight of the 1926 aggregate index though
only 50 per cent of the 1970 index. (The 44 series makeup92 per cent
of the 1924 index.) These are mostly the second-level price indexes in
BLScodingwhich arejust belowthe first level of industry aggregates,
though some available third-level series were substituted where the cor-
responding second-level index began too late anddidnot cover the full
period. The 48 series are identified in Appendix Table B. The components
andinternal weighting of these series have changed over the years, of
course, but the products covered bythem have remained largely the same
except perhaps for a fewofthe more hiqhly fabricated manufactures.
These series necessarily exclude groups which have undergone major-8-
_______(though agricultural equipment is included),
productchanges such as machineryAor which are entirely newsince the
1920s such as mostchemicals and electrical equipment. Manufactured
goodsare represented where the product group hasremained essentially
infunctional purpose,
the saineAsuch as automobiles, household furniture, and footwear,
thoughthe specifications of their individual components have changed
over time.Thesechanges in specification do not greatly affect the
rates of price change within a singlebusiness cycle, but over a longer
periodsuch changes may reflect developments in the product which alter
price behavior. So far as these series are concerned, such developments
cannot be distinguished from the changes in coverage which accompany
them. Nevertheless, these 48 series, though of restricted importance in
the later period, avoid much of the composition and weighting bias of the
aggregate index. (The coverage of Section III, which deals with individual
product prices, was feasible only for the post—World War II cycles.)
To determine the range and pattern of price changes among these
series, we may plot frequency distributions rather than construct an
aggregate index. The average level of each series was calculated for the
three months surrounding the peaks and troughs of seven National Bureau
referencecycles, the two mild ones in thel920s andthefive since
WorldWar II. The rate of change (compounded continuously) from peak to
trough of each cycle was calculated for every series. These series have
5
This rate differs from the total percentage change ,ofcourse,
since the durations of the recessions vary from 9 to 14 months, but
notgreatly for the post World-War II recessions which vary only from
9 to 12 months.
not been seasonally adjusted, which produces distortion mainly for
the highly seasonal farm prices in recessions of different length
than 12 months (all but 1970). All the rates for each recession-9-
were classified as beinginone of 14 intervals from .-20 to +10
percent per year; the width of each interior interval is 2 1/2 S
percentage points and the t extreme classes are open-ended. Zero
was made the beginning of the first positive interval in order to
distinguish price declines from no change. (The plotted frequencies
are the percentage of rates up to but not including the ratesshown
onthe horizontal axis.
RecessionRates
Chart 2 presents cumulative frequency distributions of the
percentage of rates in each interval for the seven recessions.
The chart shows that the distributions shift in successive cycles
toward smaller negative and larger positive rates of change, except
the distribution for 1949 which lies to the left of most of the
1927 distribution and of the upper half of the 1924 distribution.
In the 1949 recession,prices declined from the inflated levels carried over
from wartime, so that this episode may not represent typical peacetime
behavior.
The distributions for 1927, 1949, and 1970 have similar shapes and
differ mainly in horizontal position; the entire distributions shift
fairly uniformly to the right for successive recessions. Compared with
these three, the variability of price changes is much greater for 1924
and much less for the three recessions from 1954 to 1961. The latter
three are much steeper than the others in the middle range around a zero
rate. Their steepness reflects not only a low variability but also a bunch-
ing at low positive rates: Compared with the curve for 1927 and particu-
larly 1924, these three are deficient in the number of price declines
relative to increases, though declines are by means uncommon and represent
for these three from 41 to 52 per cent of the total number.
The successive rightward shifts of the distributions except for S


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Meansand Medians of the Rates of Change of 48
Subindexes of Wholesale Prices in Seven Mild Recessions
(percent per year)
Recesi1ii4iñ____ Mean Rate of
Unweighted Wei9hted Change
1926 Weights1970 Weightsof Ag_
(Cover 93.1%(Cover50.5% of gregate
ofTotal Index) Total Index) Index
1923_24*-7.8 _6.3 -3.8 n•C. -5.3
1926-27.-1.9 2.2 -3.0 -4.2 -2.6
1948-49-5.4 -7.8 -8.6 -8.6 -7.1
1953-54-0.2 -1.5 -1.5 -1.0 0.0
1957-58 Q2 0.4 2.0 1.7 1.7
1960-61 0.7 0.7 -0.0 0.3 0.3
1969-70 3.1 3.0 3.7 2.2 2,6
*Forty_fourseries only, which cover 92.0 per cent by 1924 weights and
92.8per cent by 1926 weights.
N.c. not computed.
.-10-
Table 2. The two constant-weight mean rates differ from the rate of change
of the aggregate index in the last column, reproduced here from Table 1,
not only in coverage but also in the method of calculation. Here the
rates of change of each component are averaged, whereas for the aggregate
index the rate of change is calculated after the levels of the component
series have been averaged.
These measures of price response rank the recessions generally
in the same order, but the use of weights and changes in the weights
do lead to some sizable differences. For the last three recessions
in particular, the weighted indexes reduce the rightward shifts shown
by the unweighted mean and median. The weighted indexes rank
the 1958 and 1961 recessions out of chronological order, while the
median and unweighted mean show progressive rightward shifts in
the postwar distributions..6 The weights place more importance on
6The 192i distribution, which in Table 2 has thelargest mean
rate of decline except for 1949, appears to be representative of
earlier recessions back to the early 1890s in both the mean and
variability of the rates of change. This observation is based
on the distributions of specific cycles in over 100 wholesale
price series. See Frederick C. Mills, The Behavior of Prices,
NBER, 1927, Table 139, p. 42l
prices which rose more in 1958. This is examined further in Section
V below. The weighted indexes are generally preferable as indica-
tors of aggregate behavior, but they canemphasize developments in
a relatively small number of markets in which the value of shipments
is very large.—11—
Recession minus Expansion Rates
Insofaras rates ofprice changerespondto business recessions grad-
ually rather than abruptly, the recession rates minusthepreceding ex-
pansionrates (both on an annual basis) will be more indicative of that
effect than the recession rates alone. Since rates of price change in
expansionsvary considerably, the shape as well as the mean of the dis-
tribution is affected. To determine how much, the expansion rates for
each series were calculated for the sevencycles and subtracted from the
correspondingrecession rates. The expansionsran fromthe trough to the
peak of the reference cycles, modified for fourof the cycles: Calendar-
year averages were used forthe beginning of the two expansions in 1921
and1924 instead of the three months surrounding the troughs because not
all the needed monthly data have been published. (The use of annual aver-
the
ages reduces the magnitude and probably/variability of the expansion rates.)
The first expansion after World War II was shortened to run from February
1947 to November 1948 to conform to the period used later in Section III
where data before 1947 are not available. And the last expansion was
started in December 1965 instead of the 1961 trough, because the inflationary
second half of this unusually long phase seemed more appropriate here than
the full period. Except for the two truncatedphases, the difference
between recession and expansion rates is equivalent to ameasure of
total cyclical amplitude.
The cumulative frequencies of the change in rates of price
change from expansion to recession are presented in Chart 3 for the
sevencycles. Four of the subindexes are not available before1926,
sothe 1924 and1927distributions comprise only 4series. All
seven distributions lie further to the left than their mates in-12-
Chart2 for recession rates alone, because expansion rates are
typically positive and the subtraction moves the recession rates
in a negative direction. The distributions in Chart 3 are also
generally flatter, indicating greater variability among the com-
ponents; as a result they are less steep around zero.
The post-World War II distributions shift successively to the
by
right, as can be seenparticularly/the medians and percentages of
declining series. -
Theseshifts, which are more prominent here than in
Chart 2, are not a mechanical result of the method of computation.
There is no arithmetical reason for the change in rates of change
in successive recessions to be higher or lower than previously,
even if the rates had an upward trend, which was true only of the
1960s. These recession-minus-expansion rates are a way of allowing
for trends in prices and focusing on recession deviations from
trend. Thus recession responses have attenuated, even allowing for
rising price trends. The progressively higher level of the rates
later
of price change in the /recessionsshown in Chart 2 reflects both
ratecarried over from the preceding expansion and the pro-
gressively smaller decline in recession rates relative to, expansion
rates.
III
Changes Since World War II
The subindexes used above are adequate to demonstrate a decline in
anplitude and variability of price responses since the 1920s. Those
data lack breadth of coverage andprecision,however. Sincethey
are subject as was noted to internal changes in weighting, which are
generally minor, but also to changes in components, which may often—13-
be important, composition bias was not absent. We may obtain a more
precise picture of changes in cyclical behavior since World War II
by confining the analysis to individual product prices (the fifth
level of the BLS code). Although few of the individual price series
comprising the wholesale price index span the period from the l920s
to 1970, 1106 run from 1947 to 1970, and an additional 32 series
ver all but the 1970 recession. These 1100-odd price series are
all that the BLS publishes which have no break and pertain to the
same product over the period, though even these undergo minor changes
from time to time in the specification of products which cannot be
avoided. The coverage by industry is shown in Appendix Table C.
Magnitude of Price Responses
The cumulative frequency distributions of the recession rates
of these 1138 series (32fewer series in the 1970 distribution1
k-
inakelitt1edifference) are presented in Chart 4. As before the
series have not been seasonally adjusted. These distributions are
broadly the same in shape and position as those in Chart 2, but al-
so are smoother and provide a sharper picture of differences between
the recessions. Chart 4 differs from Chart 2 mainly in the center
segment of the distributions, which is steeper here --showingless
variability --becauseof the inclusion of many more of the less vol-
atile prices of manufactured goods. The middle three distributions
for 1954, 1958, and 1961, which are very close together, are steeper
around zero than the other two, suggesting a downward rigidity of
prices in which the rates bunch at low positive rates (mainly zero).
This bunching reduces the number of declining series in these three






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The bunching at zero partly obscures the relative position of
the distributions, though they clearly shift rightward fromre-
cession to recessions As was done for Chart 3, wemay eliminate
most of the zero bunching and obtain more distinctive distributions
by taking the differences between the recession and expansion rates.
This is presented in Chart 5 for the same 1100-odd seriescovered by
Chart 4. The expansions run from the trough to thepeak with the
exceptions previously used for the first and last cycles: the first
runs from February 1947 to the 1948 peak because most of the series
are not available earlier, and the second runs from December 1965
to the 1969 peak in order to focus on the inflationary second half
two
of that phase. The truncation of these/phases generally increases
the measured expansion rates of price change and so tends to increase
the size of measured declines in the rates from expanion toreces-
sion. Thus the 1949 distribution stands out even more here than
in Chart 4 because its short expansion period catches thebulge
in prices following the termination of World War II price controls
in mid-1946 and records high rates of change.
Chart 5 can be viewed as measuring the recession rate of each,
price relative to its trend, where the trend is estimated by the
previous expansion rate. (A better estimate would be the average
rate of change for the three cyclical phases of previous expansion,
recession, and succeeding expansion. This more elaborate computation
was not done.) Recessions in this view work to reduce rates of
price change, but the level of prices can continue rising until --
ifever --therate gradually declines to zero. Consequently, re-
cession rates are correlated with the preceding expansion rates. The
postwar phenomenon of inflationary movements persisting in the face-15-
ofslack markets reflects the carry-over of expansion zates with
only smallreductions on the average, into recessions.
Thesignificantdevelopment in the postwar period is flOtthis
persistence of irlationary movements persebut the decline in
the response of prices to recessions As shown in Chart5, the
responses measured as changes in the rates of change have pro-
gressively declined fairly uniformly along the entire range of price
changes except for the very large declines. By 1970 the median
response to recession as measured here was virtuallyzero. The
magnitude of the dec1ir in responses is recorded by various mea-
sures of the distributions in Table 3. By either the mean, median,
or percentage of declining series, the rates of change (topsection)
in recessions became less negative or more positive,though not
entirely in sequence, and the changes in the rates (that is, re-
cession-minus-expansion rates) did so entirely in sequence for all
threemeasures. The 1966-67 mini-recession has beenadded to the
bottom group to provide a further test of the chronology of the shifts
in price behavior. It falls in its chronological order for the
median and percentage of declining series and is onlyslightly out
of order with 1961 for the mean.
The severity of postwar business cycles haC generlly been
decreasing in real terms, which conceivably might account for ihe
declining response of prices. This cannot be said of the large de-
cline in response from the l920s to the later postwar recessions,
because the differences in severitythere are slight. But it isa
possible reason for the declines following l949 The evidenceon
this point has been assembled in Chart 7. Variousmeasures of the
distributions of recession_minus_expansion rates areplotted for the-15a
Table 3
Mean and Median of the Distribution of Rates of Chanac







































Note: Expansion periods are: February 1947
to November 1948, October 1949 to July 1953,
August 1954 to July 1957, April 1958 to May
1960, and December 1965 to November 1969. Re-
cession periods are given in Table 1. Dates
for 1966-67 mini-recession are November 1966
to May 1967, and previous expansion period
begins in February 1961.
Number of series are 1138 for 1947-61,
1106for1965-70, and 1131 for 1966-67.


























'60 '62 '64 '66 '68Source to Chart 7
Rank of severity: Annual Report, NBER, 1973, P. 18. Index
of Industrial Wholesale Prices: Geoffrey H. Moore, "Prices Dur-
ing Growth Cycles," paper presented at Roundtable on Inflation,
Conference Board in Canada, Montreal, January 22, 1974. Index
of all wholesale prices: same as Table 1, except that expansion
for first cycle is February 1947 to November 1948, for mini-
recession of November 1966-May 1967 is February 1961 to November
1966, and for last cycle is December 1965 to November 1969.
1100-odd wholesale prices: Tables 3 and 5.
.-16-
five postwar recessions and the 1966-67 mini-recession. The chart
graphs the measures of Table 3 and Table 5 (presented later), the
change in rate of change of the weighted aggregate index, and the
change from peak to trough rates of corresponding cycles in the in-
dustrial component of the aggregate. A ranking of the severity of
the recessions in real terms is also presented. (This ranking omits
expansions. The severity of the total amplitude of business cycles
has also been diminishing but by less.)
All the measures of price response decline over the period as
a whole, and the ndian and percentage of rates below zero show sig-.
nificant declines from every recession to the next. Here the slight
overall response of prices to the 1970 recession does not appear as
a new phenomenon but as simply another step in the postwar progres-
sion. By contrast, the ranks of severity do not decrease in exact
sequence: 1949 and 1958 tied for st severe and 1961 and 1970 tied
r next to least severe. None of the price measures follow the time
pattern of the ranks. The price responses in the 1966-67 mini-rec-
ession are conspicuously out of order with its severity. Based on
this evidence, therefore, the declining response of pricesappears
to have occurred sequentially, due presumably to a set of ins titu-
tional and expectational developments, and not due solely to the
overall reduction in severity of recessions,though it no doubt con-
tributed.
It might also be concluded that the inflationary climate of
the expansion is apparently not crucial either, because the 1958
distribution followed upon a more inflationary expansion than did
the1961 distribution which is farther to the right.-17-
Since the response of prices to recessions has progressively
diminished, it is natural to ask whether the time lag of the response
has lengthened. To provide an answer we may examine the distri-
bution of price changes for the eight nnths following each trough.
This span was selected because it terminates the first cycle in
June 1950 as prices erupted at the outbreak of the Korean War, arid
thelast cycle in August 1971 as a price freeze was imposed. To
allow comparison between the cycles, eight nths was used for the
other recovery periods as well. To facilitate comparison withChart
5,the rate of change of each price in the preceding expansion phase
was subtracted from these rates for the eight-month period follOw-
ing the trough. The cumulative distributions of these rate differ-
ences are in Chart 6, shown earlier.
7The number of prices included here is 1104, 34 less than in
Chart 5 (the 32 series not covering the 1970 recession were ex-
cluded here from all the distributions, as well as two other ser-
ies inadvertently). These minor differences in total number of
series are of no consequence.
While the distributions in Chart 6 are quite similar in shape
to those in Chart 5, they are closer together. Compared with the
recession distributions in Chart 5, there was a shift to the right
in the reco'treries following 1949 and 1954, almost no shift follow-
ing 1958 and 1961, and a slight shift to the left following 1970.
Thus, while the, recoveries from the 1949 and 1954 recessions brought
the usual strengthening of prices relative to the recession rates,
the recession pressures on the rates of price change continued un--18-
abated after 1958 and 1961, and to some degree intensified after
1970. Chart 6 hints at a delay in the response of prices in 1970
fromthe recession to the recovery period, but the shift in these
distributions relative to their positions in Chart 5 is too slight
to be of any significance. It is the magnitude of price responses
which has changed and apparently not the lag time.
Variability and Skewness of Price Responses
Along with rjgJard shifts, the distributions display consid-
erably less variability in the post-1949 period compared with the
1920s. This was evident from the flatter distributions for the
1920s and 1949 in Charts 2 and 3. The 1924 and 1949 recessions may
be atypical, to be sure, in that they brought forth large declines
in some prices still inflated from wartime increases. Yet the mild
recession of 1928 also elicited much larger changes in a substantial
number of prices than has occurred in the postl949 recessions.
There is no doubt that large price swings have become less prevalent.
Whi].e the reduction in response and variability of prices might
appear to be related phenomena, the response has continued to de-
cline and the variability has not. The shapes of the distributions
in Charts 4and5 exhibit little change in variability after 1949,
and the measure of variability in Table 4 confirms it. This measure
is the average (absolute) deviation from the mean.8 The variability
8The means of Table 3 werecomputed from the individual rates
of change, but the average deviations in Table 4 are based on
midpointstimes frequencies of theclosedintervals and,sums of
the individual rates only in the open-end intervals Because of
bunchingat zero, the midpoint of the 0 -2 1/2 class overstates
the actual mean of this class and biases the average deviation
upward except when the mean is above the midpoint of that class
as in 1970. But this bias is bound to be small.-18a-
Table 4
Variability and Skewness of the Distribution of
Rates of Change of 1100-odd Wholesale Prices






tion from minus below taiB
mean) Median Mean (percent)
RATES OFCHANGEINRECESSIONS
1948-49 10.,1 -5.2 33,1
1953-54 5.6 -1,4 30.8
1957-58 6.3 -0.9 37,3
1960-61 5.6 -1.3 30.2





1948-49 11.8 -2.2 '12.5
1953-54 6.2 -0.5 45,5
1957-58 7.3 -0.2 48.5
1960-61 7.0 -0.4 46.4
1969-70 6.5 -0.5 44•. •7













for1949 is by far the largest, and the others differ very little
and show no tendency to decline further. (Standard deviations,
given in Appendix Table C, also show no trend.) Whatever the change
incyclical behavior whichreducedthe variability of pricessince
the 1920s, it appears so far tO have been a once-and-for-all change.
As a result, the continuing decline in the response of prices fol-
lowing 1949 hasoccurred fairly uniformly in all segments of the
distributions.
Table 4also presents measures of skewness which give a similar
though more erratic pictureof changes in the distributions. The
distributionsare all skewed to the left as shown by the means being
lessthan the medians. This implies that the size of declines in
prices was larger on balance than the size of increases, which we
might expect to characterize recessions. (The measure of momental
skewness is positive for 1954 and 1970, however, indicating that
very large increases outweighed very large declines. The use of
the third power in this measure puts great weight on very large de-
viations from the mean.)
By thedifferencebet*een the mean andmedian,the skewness
decreased after 1949 but has had little further change, particularly
for the recession-minus-expansion rates. (The larger leftward skew-
ness for the mini-recession is a surprising exception which, since
its variability was not out of line with the other recessions,
means that a relatively small number of prices had unusually large
most of
declines.) The uniformity of skewness in/the recessions after
1919 is another indication, along with variability, that the right-
ward shifts in the distributions do not reflect major shifts in-20-
the pattern of price changes across the economy.
Iv
TheBunching of Price Changes At or Near Zero
Downward Rigidity
Bunching at zero, which is often interpreted as downward rigid-
ity of prices, was noted in Charts 2and4. It is indicated there
by the jump in the cumulative frequency in the 0 -21/2 interval)
plotted at 3 1/3.
Tabulationsnot shown indicate that most of the jump represents
zero price changes. The phenomenon is portrayed in Figure 1 by the
solidcurve relative to a symmetrical distribution (dotted). Since
many prices change infrequently, a short recession would register
more zero changes than would a long recession. The recessions stud-
ied here vary from 9 to 14 months, however, not enough to rke a
great difference.
A small percentage of declining series is sometimes taken to
indicate such bunching, but a rightward shift of the distribution
also reduces the percentage declining. Another possible indication
of bunching is leftward skewness --asmeasured by the mean minus
the median --butthis may result from very large rates of
decline in a subgroup of volatile prices. To measure the effect
on the distributions due to bunching without imposing a specified
functional form on the distributions, we may rely on a simple me-
thod illustrated in Figure 1 and calculated for the postwar re-
cessions in Table 5. It is based on the assumption that a distri-
bution withOut bunching would be symmetrical around the mean.
The measure of bunching is the ratio of the actual
.Figure 1. 1-lypathetical Distributions of Rates of Price
change.Symmetrical(dotted)and Bunched
atZero (solid)








Measures of Bunching at Zero in the
Distribution of Rates of Change of 1100-odd Wholesale
Prices in Post-World War II Recessions
Recessions
Percent Ratio of Actual to
Declining Hypothetical Percent
Declininga














Note: Dates and number of series are the
same as for Tables 3 and 4.
aThe hypothetical percent declining is based
on a symmetrical distribution. See Figure 1 and
text explanation.
.- 21-
percentagedeclining to the hypothetical percentage for a symmetrical dis-
tribution. A lower ratio indicates more bunching, andunity indicatesno
bunching. The hypothetical percentage is approximated by assuming that
the frequency of price changes above 2 1/2 per cent per year is unaffected
bythe bunching at zero. Given a symmetrical distribution, the frequency
above 2 1/2 per cent equals the frequency below a point equidistant to
the left of the mean. The distribution between these two points is assumed
to lie along a straight line (in that middle range the distributions with
less bunching do appear to be linear), and the hypothetical percentage of
declining prices is read off this line. This percentage is biased down-
ward, thus overstating the bunching ratio, because bunching increases the
mean. Recalculation of the ratio with an adjusted mean to correct for this
bias indicates that thisoverstatementof the ratio is minor. (The cor-
rected ratio z 1961 is reduced from .59 to .54.)
the
By this measure of bunching, it was largest for/recession rates in 1961,
which had only
/ 59 percent of the hypothetical number of declining prices, and almostas
large in 1954 and 1958. The bunching was somewhat less in 1948 because
so many prices declined sharply in that recession) and it was considerably
lessin 1970because the hypothetical percentage declining was small.
The distributiors for recession_minus_expansion rates arelargely
free of this bias when the trend of prices is significantlyupward,
because there is no comparable tendency for firms not toreport smaller
rates of price increase. There is little evidence ofzero bunching
for these distributions in Table 5.
The phenomenon of price changes bunching at zero has receivedwide
attention. It is attributed to downward rigidity of Iadministeredv
prices, which has allegedly contributed to the persistence of
inflation• Chart 4 demonstrated its prevalence inpostwar recessions.
Is it simply a statisticalartifact of the data? Forprices fixed-22-
by contract, for example, no change occurs until they are reset
(assuming no prearranged escalation). It is not clear how many
of the BLS series reflect contract prices. Even for noncontract
prices, the I3LS compiles reports from sellers who can be expected
to omit the unannounced discounting and shading of prices often
made in actual transactions.
We may analyze this omission with the aid of the Stigler-
Kindahi collection of prices compiled from buyers, largely of
products for which "administered pricingt' was likely to be strong.9
9George Stigler and James Kindahl, The Behavior of
trial Prices, NBER, 1970, p. 23.
Their data cover the 1958 and 1961 recessions only. Chart 8 pre-
sents three sets of cumulative frequency distributions of 62 National
compiled by Stigler and Kindahi
Bureau price grouping(and the corresponding BLS indexes. Two
panels show the 1958 and 1961 recession rates, and the third panel
shows recession-minus-exnansion rates for 1961.
It is apparent that the BLS series underreport price decreases,
mainly small ones. The paired distributions are fairly close ex-
cept between -5 to 2 1/2 or 5 percent per year. It is clear from
the underlying data not shown here that the main exception occurs
at zero. This result presumably reflects a tendency of the quoted
or list prices reported to the BLS to omit market shading when no
change in the list price has occurred, but to include them when the
list strays too far from the market price and is changed. Thus
the paired price series display the same cyclical behavior, as is






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































price changes for 1958 of .81 and a regression coefficient of tht
31.5 on the N3ER series of .91. That is, the 3LS series S
displayed91 percent, on the average)of the rates of change
in the NBER prices. (This regression was not computed for
1961, but it would give similar results.)
The last panel of the chart also shows a difference in zero
bunching between the two sets of data. Although such chan9es in the
rates of price change generally do not bunch at zero, the expansion
rates for this cycle were fairly small, and the bottom panel par-
tially replicates the results for recession rates alone.
There may be other reasons, to be sure, for part of the dif-
ference between these two sources of price data. The Stigler-
Kindahl data involve some interpolation of price observations,
which spreads a change occurring in one month over the intervening
months back to the previous observation. This makes less difference for the
9 to 12 month recession periods used here, however, than for in-
dividual months. Also, buyers who shift to lower-priced sellers
would report a price decline even though all sellers reported no
change. This causes the Stigler-Kindahi data based on buyers to
overstate price changes. On the other hand, the BLS apparently does
not list contract prices except in the month they are set, while
Stigler-Kindahl list them in all months of the contract period as
having no change. These differences in buyer and seller reports
are difficult to evaluate, but the tentative conclusion seems valid
that the greater zero bunching in the ELS series mainly reflects the
omission of market discounting from list prices.
If we take the difference in bunching between the BLS and
NBER data in Chart 8 at face value, the percentage of24_
declining series reported in Table 5 can be adjusted for rtificial
bunching. The adjustment10 raises the percentage of declining series
10For price changes in the interval -2 1/2 to +2 1/2 percent
per year, the percentage declining in 1958 is 45•45 percent by
the Stigler-Kindahi data and 5.26 percent by the BLS data and in
1961, 67.87 and 15.15 percent, respectively. This implies that
40.19 and 52.71 percent of the BLS series in 1958 and 1961, re-
spectively, should be shifted from the interval 0 -21/2 to less
than zero. These percentages were applied to manufactures with
concentration ratios above 33 percent only and not to all series
in that interval on the view that the nonmanufacturing and lowest
concentration industries are less likely to display bunching at
zero. This also reduces the size of the adjustment. (The elimin-
ation of low concentration industries is consistent with the an-
alysis of Section V below and with numerous studies in the litera-
ture on pricing in concentrated industries.) For 1958, there are 2l
series shifted in this way and for 1961, 295 series, which results in
the percentages reported in the text.
from 30.5 to 40.2 for 1958 and from 31.2 to 48.9 for 1961. The
ratio of these adjusted figures to the hypothetical percentage de-
clining in Table 5 is raised from .66 to .87 for 1958 and from .59
to .92 for 1961. The adjustment therefore accounts for a substan-
tial part of the bunching, though apparently not all. The downward
rigidity of wholesale prices, though not entirely a statistical arti-
fact of list instead of transaction prices, is certainly minor. The
çersistence of inflation since World War II is not, therefore, char-
acterized by downward rigidity so much as a general tendency of
prices in the whole range of rates to respond less to recessions.
High Kurtosis
Although the bunching of price changes at zero is partly arti--25-
ficialand hardly noticeable in the distributions of recession-.
minus-expansion rates, the latter distributions display the related
phenomenon of extremely high kurtosis --thatis, compared with
the standard normal distribution, they are denser around the mean
and extendedin the tails. Table 6gives the sample kurtosis and
standarddeviationfor these distributions in the postwar reces-
sions. The kurtosis (a pure number) is many times the size expec-
ted from a normal population, which is 3. A high kurtosis has been
noted elsewhere as characteristic of distributions of price changesj0
'°See Mills, jcit., esp. Figure 45,p. 343, and Wesley C.
Mitchell, The Making and Using of Index Numbers, Bureau of Labor
Statistics Bulletin No. 656 (March 1938), reprinted from Bulletin
No. 284 (1921),esp.pp. 14-21.
Morethan most other economic variables, changes in prices are
abnormally clustered at a modal value (usually zero) relative to
their total dispersion. What is the reason?
One common example is the sequence of price changes over time
in commoditymarkets,in which daily pricechanges are usually
small butinfrequently interspersed with very large changes. Such
the kurtosis of the sequence of individual price changes
over time, see Benoit Mandeibrot, "The Variation of Certain Specu-
lative Prices," Journal of Business, October 1963, 394-l9, and
Peter B. Clark, "A Subordinated Stochastic Process Model with Fi-
nite Variance for Speculative Prices,TT Econometrica, Jan. 1973, 135-55.
a sequence is not pertinent here to price changes among products
over the same period of time, however Deviations from the mean-25a-
Table 6
Kurtosis and Standard Deviation of Distributions
of Rates of ChangeofWholesale Prices, Post-World
War II Recessions
Recession Rates minus Expansion Rates
1948-491953-541957-581960-611969-70
Kurtosis .. , 8.9 16.8 25.8 12.9 16.4
Standard De-
viation (%
peryear)..17.5 11.4 13.9 12.9 11.9
Note:Computed from rates of change of prices covered in
Chart ,Kurtosisis defined as the fourth moment divided





rate of price change among products depend upon a large number of
influences, andwemight at first expect their combined effect to
follow a normal frequency distribution. But the central limit
theorem for a normal distribution requires that theprobability dis-
tributions of the contributing influences not differ toogreatly,
which is not likely here. Basic commodity prices aretypically
more volatile than the prices of highly fabricated products, be-
cause of differences in the operation of their respective markets.
Even aside from such characteristic differezxesamong prices, the
deflationary pressures of a recession can hit different sectors with
'erying severity and speed.
Table 6 shows considerable variation in kurtosis over the
period. The kurtosis of the 1949 distribution is the lowest and
its standard deviation the highest, because theprice changes are
widely dispersed. This is evident from examination of the histogram
of its price changes (not shown). The 1954 and 1970 distributions
have practically equal values in Table 6, indicating that the funda-
mental determinants of the distributions had no trendover this rer-
iod. Relative to these two, the 1958 distribution has a high kur-
tosis and standard deviation because of a greater number ofvery
large values out in the tails, and the 1961 kurtosis is lowbecause
the distribution is less peaked.
As an analytical explanation of these high values ofkurtosis,
we may describe price changes in a recession asgenerated by a nor-
mal distribution subordinate toa process which directs the degree volatility and
of/deflationarypressures among prices. Furthermore, we might view
this process as a distribution which determines the varianceof the
normal distribution from which each price change is drawn. Thenthe
kurtosis of the subordinated distributiondepends upon theratio-27-
(squared) 32 ofthe variance to the mean/of the directing process. The sub-
1•'SeeClark, ibid. I have benefited from discussions with
Clark on the application of subordinate normal distributions to
the present data.
ordinated distribution has a kurtosis necessarily greaterthan the
3 of a normal distribution.
In these terms a change in kurtosis reflects a change in the
generating process. A increase in the ratio of its variance to
its mean raises the kurtosis of the distribution of price changes.
On certain assumptions an increase in uniformity of price anticipa-
tions among firmswoulddecrease the mean but not the variance of
the generating process, and hence would *cre the ratio of variance
tothe mean and also icrease thekurtosis. Since kurtosis has not
beenincreasing over the inflationary postwar period, we might at
first conclude that the anticipated rate of inflation, even though
itrose, did not become more uniform. As is shown in the Appendix,
however, the effect of a greater uniformity of price anticipations
onthe kurtosis is very slight, and an inference about their uniforra-
ity fromthe kurtosis of these distributions cannot be drawn.
V
PricesGrouped by Durability, Value Added, and Concentration
To what extent does the reduced response of prices in successive
business recessions following 1949 reflect the behavior of partic-
ular groups of prices? The answer will help identify which of var-
ious possible influeixes may underlie this development. Three class--.2 8-.
ifications ofpriceswere selected for examination. They
pertaintothe durability of the product, the ratio of
valueadded in production to shipments, and the concentration of firms
in the industry. The classification by durability follows the fourfold
BLS groupingof wholesale prices as of1967 into durable and nondurable
manufactures,anddurableandnondurableraworslightly processed goods.
Whilethe durable nonmanufactures comprise very few series in our sample
and have been omitted, the other three groups are large enough to allow
comparison of the frequency distributions of their prices. Value added
and concentration canbe derived from the BLSassignmentofeach wholesale
product price to a five-digit SIC industry, for which the 1963 census of
manufacturesprovides data on value added and shipments13andconcentration. 14
13
Thesedata cover total shipments of establishments in the indus-
try andthereforecover all products, not just the main one on which
classification of the establishment is based. This produces some error
inour classification of prices.
14
The fraction of total industry shipments by the four largest
firms was used.In afew cases where the four_firm ratio for 1963
wasnotavailabl, the concentration ratio for 1958 wasusedif the
eight-firm ratio suggested that the concentration of the industry had
not changed much since 1958.
These data are not published for every five-digit industry,sothat some
manufacturing prices had to be omitted from these distributions in addi-
tion to the exclusion of all nonmanufacturing prices (farming and mining).
However, to minimize exclusions, value added andshipmentsfor unavailable
five-digitproduct codes were approximated by the corresponding four-digit
data where the five-digit product was the only one in the four-digit-29-
group,though this inadvertently incorporates other miscellaneous products
of the four-digit industry. Individual price series were classified ac-
cording to these ratios into low, middle, or high ratios of value added to
shipments andsimilarlyfor concentration. 15 Since these two classifications
15
The dividing lines were, for the value-added ratio, O-.400,
.401-.600, and.601-1.000and, for concentration, 0-.33, .34-.67,
and.68-1.00.Theseboundaries were chosen to provide wide inter-
vals each of which would contain a fairly large number of price series.
arebasedon1963 data,they arelessappropriate for other years, but
thesecharacteristics of the products and the industries are not likely
to have changed greatly even over the two decades from 1948 to 1970; the
task of reclassifyingthe prices using other survey years wasnot deemed
worthwhile.
Although these classifications are quite different in concept,
theymay in fact overlap for many prices. Such interdependence of
characteristics makes indentification of influences on price behav-
ior difficult. Still, with the large number of prices in our sample,
there is sufficient diversification to allow some indication of dif-
ferences in behavior.
Charts 8-10 present cumulative frequency distributions for all
the previous 1100-odd product prices except those omitted from these
classifications for the reasons noted.
Prices Classified by Degree of Processing and Durability of Product (Chart 9)
The group of lare1y unprocessed goods isolates the raw materials,
which characteristically undergo large price fluctuations. The raw
materials aside, the relevance of durability to price behavior concerns









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 finished goods have variable use lives, and replacennt cn be
postponed. Consequently, we expect that theirelasticityof de-
mand with respect to short-run changes in price tends to be higher
than for nondurables, resulting in less short-run price fluctuation.
true, soNe
This is not invariably/of course, since users of/nonessential non-
durables can also do without for temporary periods.) This classi-
fication also corresponds to degree of perishability, which determines
the feasibility of sizable inventories. Inventories absorb short-run
changes in demand and also dampen price fluctuations. Unfortunately,
this correspondence is only a rough one. The durable manufactures
sieid
are not all finished goods; or the demand for them may be /to main-
tainproduction schedulesfor the products of which they are coinpon-
ents. Furthermore, apart from perishable basic foods, the nondur-
able group includes textiles, leather, paper, petroleum, chemicals,
and other such products classified as nondurable but regularly held
ininventory. No attempt was made to alter the BLS classification
for present purposes. Nevertheless, BLS durability still corresponds
in part to the degree of importance of inventories in pricing. This
classification helps to show whether these characteristics of products
are related tothechanges incyclicalbehavior ofprices.
Chart 9 reveals a sharp difference between the nondurable, largely
unprocessed goods and thetwo manufacturing groups. As expected, the
distributioiof the former are much flatter, indicating considerable
variability of price response to the recessions. The smaller number of
series covered by this group (about one-fifth of the other two) makes- 31_
these distributions more jagged but would not ordinarily affect their
slope or median. The strong dependence of these prices on short-run
market conditions apparently is the reason why these distributions do
not shift successively rightward for each recession, as do those for the
twomanufacturing groups and for the combined distributions in Chart 5.
Indeed,the distribution for 1970 in Chart 9A is further to the left
thanthat for 1958. In the 1970recession basic commodity prices de-
clinedas usual, while in the late 1950s they weakened during the final
stages of the business expansion andbeganto recover in the 1958 re-
cessionbefore it ended.
The distributions for the two manufacturinggroups (Charts 9B and
9c)aresurprisingly similar, though as expected the durables exhibit
somewhat less variability. Both sets show successive rightward shifts
from one recession to the next, but less for the durables than the non-
durables except in 1970. Apart from the raw materials, therefore, the
rightward shifts in successive recessiOns do not differ by durability
and byinference are not related to inventories.
Prices classified by ratio of value added to shipments (ChartlO)
Ahigher value-added ratio means that materials and fuels are less im-
portant inthe cost of production, and wages and salaries, which are less respon-
demandshifts,
siveto/ playthe main role.Ofcourse, labor costsare a component
in the end product.
of materials too, but the proportion is lower! A higher ratio therefore
gives less importance to volatile prices of raw materials, and this explains
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in the three groups are 28, 50, and 66 percent. respectively, and
the variability roughly declines by that relative amount between
the first twogroups,though by less between the second two (see
Table 7, below).
Foreach recession the medians of the distributions for each
higher group of ratios tend to move rightward, though much less so
for the later than the earlier recessions. Also, the distributions
for the higher ratios cluster more around zero and exhibit a re-
sponse to recession which is smaller over-all and changes less over
the postwar period.
Taken all together, these results support the view that the
inflexibility of wage rates (due to custom as well as union baroziin-
ing) contributes to the lack of responsiveness of prices to re-
cessions, whereas a high dependence in production on basic materials
adds to price variability. Yet the tendency in successive recessions
for the rate of change of prices to decline less or rise more rel-
ative to expansion rates cannot be attributed directly to labor
Costs. These rightward shifts are largest for those prices having
the greatest variability and least dependence on wages. In the
l99 and 1954 recessions at the beginning of the postwar period,
the high value-added group displayed the least price response but
the subsequent rightward shifts in the distributions for this
group were also the smallest. Hence the rightwarcl shifts in the
total distributions of Chart 5 reflect a reduction in price re-
sponse to the later recessions more by the lower value-added
products. By implication wage costs have not contributed to the re-
duction in price responsiveness.-33 -
Pricesclassified by concentration ratio (Chart11).Concentrated
industrjes have long been linked to short-run price inflexibility, 16
'6See Gardner C. Means, Industrial Prices and Their Relative
flexibility, Senate Doc. 13 (74th Cong., 1st Sess.), 1935.. See aJso
Hearings on Administered Prices, Part 9, See. Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly,1959, pp.4745-6ONatIOflal Resoüiis Committee, The Structure of the
American Economy, Part II, June 1939, p. 143.
supposedly because they engage in oligopolistic price fixing or, even
without overt collusion, administer prices independently of short-run
market conditions. Quite apart from pricing by oligopolies, various
might
arguments can be devised why firms /preferto avoid frequent price
changes, which concentration may facilitate. Marketoncentration ratios,
however, may be a poor measure of the control exercised over market prices.
often
Theavailable industry data /excludeimportant substitutes and SO do
notfollow the most relevant market boundary. Furthermore, the number of
dominant firmsinan industry is by momeansalways a good index of the
degree of competition. Although profits are supposed to benefit from
such control over prices, various studies have found concentration to be
17 apoor indicator of profit rates among industries. Despite these doubts
17
For a recent survey of thesestudies, see Harold Demsetz, The
Market Concentration Doctrine, AEI-Hoover Policy Study 7,August1973.
and limitations,however, the concentrationratiois used here to approx-
imatethe degree to which firms can setprices independently of immediate
marketconditions. This use follows the coon notion of "administered
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specific formula of pricing, such as target-return or markup pri-
cing. As originally used by Gardner Means, administered pricing
wasinversely related to the frequency with which firms changed
their prices.18 For present purposes, however, this is not a
18Means, op.cit. See also the exchange betweenMeans
icanEconomic Review, June 1972, 292-306) and Stigler and Kindahi
(American Economic Review, Sept. 1973, 717-21).
atisfactory classification because it is not defined independently
of the price series.
In Chart iithedistributions for the more concentrated indus-
triesgenerally show less price response --theyhave smaller vari-
ability and lie closer to zero, though this observation makes no
allowance for overlapping between concentration, durability, and
high value added, all of which work in the same direction. To
the extent that it is justified, this observation supports the con-
tention that in concentrated industriesprice adjustments to a
changein sales are delayed longer; this presumably reflects a
greater ability to set prices independently of market conditions.
(i3asedon Section V, underreporting of maket•price shading does jot a-ear to be important foi tiese distibution of chang in rates of "Delay seems theproper description ofthis behavior,'bëcause t1iëchancie.)
isnoimplication that prices of cicentrated industries do not
adjust in the long run to a change in market developments which is
not reversed over the business cycle.
Amongthe three groups,thedistributions of the lowconcentration
groupdisplaythe smallest rightward shifts in successive recessions.
Thepriceresponse of these industries, which tend to respond quickly
tomarket conditions, has not changed much over thepostwar period. Yet
therightwardshifts are generally no smaller in the middle than inthe- 35-
highconcentrationgroup, and aresomewhat larger in the middlegroup for
the1970 recession. The tendency of prices to respond less in successive
recessions cannot, therefore, be attributed to the special behavior of
highly concentrated industries but is a more general phenomenon.
Suimnaryofgroupeddistributions. Certain groups of products
reveal differences in theresponsiveness of their prices to recessions.
Table7 providessummary measures of the distributions for value added
and concentration. Larger (negative) responses are characteristic
of low market concentration and high materials costs. Along with larger re-
sponses t recicn,these pricesexhibit greater variability. Such dif-
ferences are borne out by product groups (see Appendix Table C), in which




Apartfrom basic commodity markets where prices closely follow
short-run demand andsupplyconditions, other wholesale prices exhibit a
pervasive tendency to respond to recessions less and less over the post-
war period. This tendency does not appear to be dominated by the behavior
of any particular group, though it is strongest for manufactures with low
value added andmediumconcentration.
VI
Summaryand Interpretation of Findings
Thefailureof the aggregate index of wholesaleprices to decline
in the recessions of 1954 and 1958 and then again in 1961, which con-

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































atthe time as a new phenomenon. The change in behavior was attri-
buted to the emergence of dvmward rigidity in prices and a ten-
dency of producers to "administer't their prices with less regard
for short-run changes in market demand. Why did this phenomenon
emerge following the 1949 recession? One explanation given was
the growth of market power of firms to set prices and of labor
unions to dictate wages. Yet, while labor unions had become stronger
compared with the 1940s and earlier decades, firms as a whole did
not appear to have more market power. Another explanation was that
price setting is strongly influenced by anticipations of future
levels. The Employment Act of 1946, which had committed the govern-
ment to pursue full-employment policies, was followed in the post-
war years by an upward trend of prices, and the two together rein-
forced a belief that any deflationary pressures would be brief. Pre-
sumably that dissuaded firms from reducing prices in recessions.
Some theories of inflation see large firms as raising prices in
excess of increases in costs? even at a time of excess capacity, in
order to maintain profit margins as output contracts, but most of
the postwar inflationary movements could be attributed to excess
demand pressures if due allowance were made for lags in response.
Given sporadic bursts of demand-pull inflation, the failure of prices
to undergo offsetting declines during the ensuing recessions seemed
sufficient at that time to explain the upward trend of prices.19
'9Fora survey of inflationtheories discussed in the 1950s,
seeMartin Eronfenbrenner and Franklyn D. Holzman, "Survey of
Inflation Theory," American Economic Raview, Sept. 1963, 593-661..-37-
The emphasis on downward rigidity was not sufficient, however,
to explain the continuing rise of most prices in 1970 when the re-
!any rriceE; fii1cc.
cessionhad eliminated most excess demand pressures.
to respond in 1970 even by rising less rapid'y. While laos in
the system could be invoked to argue that prices continued rising to
catch up with previous cost increases, such lags had not been equally
significant in previous recessions. The new behavior required a
revision of the theories.
An important revision brought in the anticipated rate of in-
flation as a basic determinant of price changes to which the effects
of market demand and supply conditions were then added.'The an-
20
See Milton Friedman, "Comment in G.P. Shultz and R.Z. Aliber
(eds.), Guidelines, Informal Controls, and the Market Place, Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1966, and Edmund S. Phelps, "Fhillirs Cur-
ves, Expectations of Inflation and Optimal Unemployment over Time,
Economica, Aug. 1967, 254-81.
ticipated rate supposedly depends upon anticipated trends in unit
costs at standard levels of capacity utilization. Declines in de-
mand reduce the rate of price change relative to the anticipated
rate.Ahighanticipated rate makes the actual rate highand, if
demand subsequently declines, prices continue rising, albeit less
rapidly. Iising prices in 1970 could thus be explained by antici-
pated rates of inflation higher than those in earlierrecessions.
Itfollows that the price response to recessions should be measured
by the rates of change relative to the anticipated rates. In the-38-
absenceof an acceptable measure of anticipated rates, the
precedingexpansion rates served here asroughproxies, thouoh
admittedly they are far from adequate. If the response tore-
cessionswere to remain unchanged, the distribution of recession
ratesof changeminus expansionrates should be the same from one
recession to the next. A theoretical formulation of such price
behavior is presented in the first section of the Appendix.
Thefindingsof this study of individual prices partly support
and partly modify these views. Changes inthe composition of the
aggregateindexes over time have affected their cyclical behavior.
Even so, there is no doubt that the average rate of decline in
prices in recessions has diminished sire the 1920s. It is true
that the distributions of recession price changes display a high
variability, less than in the 1920s but still considerable and
littlechanged in the past four recessions. The wide range of
changes has long been noted.21 It indicates the diversity of price
21Mills,2p.cit. and Mitchell, pp.cit. See also RufusS.
Tucker,"Reasons for Price Rigidity," American Economic Review,
March 1938, 41- 54
behavior,reflecting both random variations and persistent differ-
ences between certain groups of prices. The variability of price
changes was less in the recessions following 1949 in part because
of greater bunching at zero, which waswidelyinterpreted to imply
adownw rigidity of prices. But such bunching results largely from
a bias toward zero change in reported prices, which the Stigler-Kindahi
.-39-
data for transaction prices in 1959 and 1961 show did in fact de-
cline moderately (Section IV). If we allow for this bias, however,
the data still indicate a general reduction in the size and number
of declines in prices since the 1920s.
This reduction in response is clearer in the distributions of
recession-minus-expansion rates, which exhibit little bunching at
zeros These rates also crudely allow for differences in the trends
of prices and are equivalent to uasures of overall cyclicalampli-
tude. This amplitude has diminished since the l920s and has contin-
uedto diminish in consecutive recessions Ixpansion and recession
rates have both helped to reduce the c1ica1 amplitude, but th
change for recession rates has been greater. A decrease in the
severity of business recessions in real terms undoubtedly has Con-
tributed,but it does not provide a full explanation, because the
severity of the five postwar recessions has not decreased chrono-
logically. The l96-67 mini-recession was examined as an additional
test case, and the size of its response to prices fell between that
of 1961 and 1970 even though it was less severe than either ofthose
recessions.
Furthermore, although the variability,of recession price changes
has contracted sharply since the 1920s, it has remained thesame
following 1919. Deve1opnnts in market structure and mix which could
stabilize price fluctuations would showup in the variability of
price. Since variability has not decreased, we may conclude that
the continued decline in response to recessions has occurredaJonc
the entire distribution of price changes and does not reflectany
alteration in market structure ich also affectsvariability (or,
for that matter, skewness and kurtosis aswell, which also show no
trends).-40-.
Whyhaverecession declines in the rate of price change pro-
gressively diminished? The answer cannot be that anticipated rates of
inflation rose While that was probably true, rising antici-tcd r k:vu1d
not account for diminishing dec1ii in the ra.tes of change. The answer
involves either or both a reduction in magnitude of priceresponses to
excess capacity or an increase in the speed of adjustment of anticipations
to actual price changes. The first would be influenced by the history of
restraints taken against inflation. If declines in demandgrowth have
been brief, the response to the next one will be less. It is hard to
believe that the postwar history of government failures to curb inflation
has not affected price responses significantly. Second, the speed of
adjustment of the anticipated rate to the actual rate of inflation can
be important, because it will affect the difference between the two at
is likely to
the beginning of recessions. A decline in demand ./reducethe rate of
therate
pricechange more, the further /hasrisen above theanticipated rate
Thus
during the business expansion./ price increases would presumably be re-
versed faster in a subsequent recession if they had recently accelerated
than if they had been rising at a fairly constant rate for some time,
though an offset to this faster reversal is the persistence of accelerated
inflation while its lagged effects on costs work through theeconomy.
The actual and anticipated rates will also becloser should anticipa-
tions be adjusted faster.
These considerations suggest two reasons why the anticipated rate
of inflation at the beginning of the 1970 recessionmay have been closer
to the actual rate than had been trie at previous cyclical peaks and why,
therefore, the average price response was so slight. First,
the rate of inflation at the end of 1969 had been about the same for a
year or two. Second, the adjustment of anticipations may have become
faster as a result of the recurring postwar periods of inflation.Ofcourse,--
thespeed of adjustment is hard to judge because it is influenced by the
and because,
variability as well as the duration of inflation /unfortunately, there is
little direct evidence on the behavior of anticipations.
Havestructural changes occurred in product markets to account for
the decline in price responsesr There has, for example, been a steady
growth in the relative importanceof highly specialized and fabricated
products,which characteristically fluctuate less in price than do raw
materials. But this cannot account for the rightward shifts of the dis-
tributions, which are composed of the same set of prices. In a related
classification of the prices into durable and nondurable manufactures,
the latter exhibited somewhat larger rightward shifts than the former.
The exception to successive shifts is shown by prices of raw materials,
which continue to exhibit their characteristic sharp and variable responses
tomarket developments. Other classifications of prices which might be
thought to reveal structural changesare the concentration of markets
and the ratio of value added to shiments of producers. It is true that
variability of price changes is lower in more concentrated markets and
for firms with high value-added ratios. And the more concentrated markets
exhibit fewer price declines in the recessions. But these differences between
groups of prices have remained the same over the postwar period. The re-
sponse to recessions of the high valued-added andconcentration groups has
declined the same or perhaps less than the others. Therefore, even if
they increased in relative importance, which is not generally true, they
cannotaccount for the general decline in response.-42-
Thedecisive influence on price response appears to have been
ageneral adaptation of economic units to inflationaryprospects and
governmentpolicy rather than structural developments. Thus the
change in price behavior appears to be long range and therefore not
likely to change much either way withina few years. The attenua-
tion of price responses appears tohave moderated cyclical accel-
aboutequally across industrjTes.
erations as well as decelerations of price changes,/ The problem for
aggregate demand management is that the upside moderation encourages
with the attendant build—up of inThtionrv rr
the prolongation of expansive policies/a óñiijffticn Eurc?,
causes impatience with policy restraints, thus tilting the result-
ant trend of prices upward.
.Appendix --47
(reduces themeanand therefore
smal1 Sire a reduction in increases the variance of the
2
directing process relative to the mean, the reduction increases
the kurtosis.
As a rough indication of magnitude, in was 11.92 in 1970 and
2
k was 16.4 (Table 6). We do not krow 0, thevariance of p, but
1
2 it seems likely that it was much smaller than m,say at most 2
If so, then (5) shows k to be on the order of 4 percent. Thus,

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































rate,prices would be rising in part to reflect current, as well
as to catch up to past, excess demand, the first term of equation
1.It is certainly conceivable for lagged excess demand to raise
prices even though p were above e and there was a deficient current
demand, that is, a negative D-S. Such a rise in prices greater
than e could be described as due to the push of past cost in-
creases not previously adjusted to.
The Distribution of p Across Products
The distribution of p depends upon the distribution of ex-
cess demand and of Splausiblethat deviations of indi-
vidual price changes from the economy-wide mean rate of change
reflectmyriad small influences and therefore are normally distri-
hited. The variance of the probability distributions whichgen-
erate individialprice changes differs among products, however,
because of characteristic differences in the volatility of prices.
For a given point in time we have, for each product i,
(2) p =cL.L[D.(p.)-S.(p.)1+
Bythe previous assumptions the first term follows a normal
2 distributionwith some meananda variance cy .whichare dif-
1,i
ferent for each product, and the second term is normally distri-
2
buted with some mean and a variance 2 which are the same for
all products. The assumption that the variance of e is the same
across products is crucial to the following argument, but it seems
reasonable as a first approximation: The anticipated rate of
price change for a product will depend mainly upon prospects for
inflation in the economy at large and ordinarily much lessupon
developments in the individual sectors. Individual firms will
assess these prospects differently, of course, butnyst of theAppendix --46
relevant inf1uerxes are the sameandtherefore the distribution of
perceived possibilities would generally be the same.
Then p. has a distribution subordinate to a normal probability
function in which the variance of the normal function is directed
by a process with mean
in 2 2 2 2
(3) m; (Ycr ) = +
andvariance —
n 7 2 - 2 1
(4) $= r( +-)- ml=(O -
Thekurtosis of the suborindated normal distribution is1
S
(5) k =3(1+2). m
1
This is shown by Clark, op.cit. I am indebted to Clark for
the following proof and interpretation of the kurtosis.
If nowtheuniformity across products of the anticipated rate
of inflation changes, this is reflected in a smaller whichre-
duces the variability of p by the same amount. What happens to
its kurtosis? We have àm/O 1and s/￿m =O.Therefore,
from (5), the change in kurtosis with respect to a change in 0
(in percentage terms in order to abstract from the arbitrary time
unit of measurennt of p), is
2 2
(6) àk2- -2(k_3)t32 k) -m3k
-
km
Since these parameters are all necessarily positive, the effect on
k is negative. In words,thekurtosis depends upon the variance
squared
of the directing process as a percentage of its mean/as in (5).
The variance may be high absolutely, but, if the mean is also
very high, the percentage variation in the directing process is-43-
Appendix
Anticipations and the
Distribution of T)rice Changes
This appendix develops a theoretical relationship between the
kurtosis of the distribution of price changes and the uniformity of
rrice anticipations. A smaller variability of anticipated rates of
inflation will reduce the variability of the actual rates and will
also, in combination with demand influences on prices, increase the
kurtosis of the distribution, though by very little. We begin by
formulatingthe effect of excess demand and anticipations on price
changes.
A Model of Price Changes
For each product we may postulate demand and supply schedules
which are continually shifting upward because of inflation (and
rightward because of grcwth in real terms). The anticipated rate
of increase in their intersection point is pe, which represents
the anticipated rate of equilibrium price increase. The antici-
pated level of the demand and supply schedules is not at any time
necessarily equal to the actual levels D and S. The excess quan-
tity demanded implied by these actual schedules at the market price
p is, for some point in time, D -S,and we may suppose that thi.s
helps determinegivenan adjustment fraction x and distributed
lag function L as follows:
(1) p czLID(p) -S(p)1+e
The lag function L reflects delays in adjusting to past cost
increases, which accounts for the time it takes for increases in
the prices of factors of production to work through the price system.
Actual prices rise along the anticipated path e with devia-
tions which depend with a lag upon D-S. The anticipated path changesAppendix _44_
slowly over time, so that D-S does not remain always positive or
negative but moves cyclically above and below the anticipated path.
A change in aggregate demand is reflected in the rate of change
of demandand affects excess demand D-S. depends upon past
rates of price change as well as information about future develop-
ments. It is unrelated to current excess demand D-S. A special
case is for pe to equal the anticipated rise in unit costs at a
'standard" level of capacity utilization. It is possible for p
to be rising even though D-S is negative. Thus a slowing
of aggregate demand makes D-S negative, so that fisless than ,
andD equals S at a price lower than the current p.
Equation 1 implies corresponding adjustments in quantities to
the discrepancy between D and S. Assuming there are inventories,
one possibility is that dollar sales are D(p) and the value of
production is S(p), so that the bracketed expression is the un-
planned change in the value of inventories (ignoring planned changes
and revaluations of inventory stocks due to price changes). But
the actual amoun sold and produced might not be on either schedule,
though sales would be less than D. Thus D(p) is the maximum demand
and S(p) the desired production, hypothetical amounts which the
firm estimates through its experience n the market.
It is difficult to imagine equation 1 without the price anti-
cipations terms, for that would imply that price changes always
moved according to (a lagged function of) excess demand. A moving
equilibrium of rising prices would then not be possible. Yet ii:
seems plausible that a fully anticipated inflation could occur in
which excess demand at each moment was zero. In general, however,
jcouldbe above or below e•
If the anticipated rate of inflation were below the actualTable B
Forty-eight Subindexes Used in Charts 1and2
1926 1970
BLS Code Subindex WeightWeight
011 Fresh anddriedfruits andvegetables 2.30 1.176
012 Grains 3.62 1.198
013 Livestock 6.71 2.851
014 Poultry .si .255
015 Plant and animalfibers 3.88 .437
016 Fluid milk 2.87 2.081
017 Eggs .99 .510
018 Hay, hayseeds and oilseeds 1.13 .694
019 Other farm products (coffee, beans, tea,
tobacco, andnuts) 1.17 .835
021 Cereal andbakery products 4.27 2.017
022 Processed meats, poultry, andfish 9.59 4.153
023 Dairy products 2.53 2.300
024 Processed fruits andvegetables .63 .866
025 Sugar andconfectionaryproducts 2.44 1.268
0272 Crude vegetable oils .45 .165
0291 Cattle feed .43 .186
031 Cotton products 3.44 1.086
032 Wool products 2.50 .346
037 Miscellaneous textiles (jute, ropetwine) .97 .132
041 Hides andskins .77 .077
042 Leather .84 .179
043 Footwear 1.77 .694
051 Coal 6.87 .700
052 Coke .93 .092
056 Crude petroleum 3.06 .628
057 Refined petroleum products 4.48 3.459
0622 Paint materials .65 .212
0651 Mixed fertilizers .28 .181
0652 Fertilizer materials .32 .211
0711Crude rubber .81 .201
0712 Tires andtubes 1.73 .611
081 Lumber 2.61 1.259
0911 Woodpulp .29 .274
0913 Paper 1.08 1.314
0914 Paperboard .34 .426
1010 Iron andSteel 4.80 4.797
1020Nonferrous metals 2.11 3.376
1050*Plumbing fixtures andbrass 0.00 .181
1110Agricultural machinery and equipment .21 .705
1210Household furniture 1.21 .925
1230Floorcoverings .46 .336
1320Concreteingredients .96 .630
1360*Asphalt roofing o.oo .120
1391 Building lime .04 .006
14110Z* Motor trucks .00 .915
141101Passenger Cars 5.40 5.265
1522*Cigars 0.00 .091
1523Other tobaccoproducts .69 .063
TOTAL WEIQ-IT 01ffOF100 93.14 50.484
(continued)Appendix --50
Source: 1926 weights: BLS, Bulletin 473 (Jan. 1929), Appendix B,
pp. 251-62.
1970 weights: December 1970 relative importance of
"former"index(based on 1963 shipment, BLS, Wholesale
PricesPrice Indexes for Jan.1971 (July 1971),
Table16.
Coding is based on /'7revision.
*
Omittedfor 1924 recession in Chart 1 and also 1927 in Chart 2.
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